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ARGUMENT
Jim Cassidy ("Cassidy") through his counsel of record, files this Reply Brief in Support of
his appeal from the decision of the Third District Court granting Summary Judgment to the Salt Lake
County Fire Civil Service Council ("Council"). Salt Lake County Fire Chief Larry Hinman failed
to promote Cassidy because Cassidy filed a grievance expressing his concerns about a potential
threat to public safety arising out of a decision by the Fire Department to be less aggressive in
enforcement of the fire code:
Q. Okay, You also made a comment that you didn't promote Mr. Cassidy because
of an appeal he had filed with the Civil Service Council with regard to your
enforcement of the fire code.
A. Yes.
Transcript at 217.
Once Cassidy showed that his protected activity played a substantial role in the decision not
to promote him, the burden switched to the Fire Department to show "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [Cassidy's promotion] even in the
absence of the protected conduct." Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Dovle. 429 U.S. 274,287
(1977).
The trial court's findings that Cassidy did not engage in protected speech are clearly
erroneous and not supported by the evidence. As a result, the Court's failure to switch the burden
to the Council to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway constitutes legal error
requiring reversal of the decision below.

1

I. THE SALT LAKE COUNTY FIRE CHIEF IS NOT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE
PARTY TO CASSIDY'S CLAIM.
On October 1,1997, The Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service Council brought a Motion for
Summary Disposition before this Court arguing that because the Council had no jurisdiction to hear
Cassidy's promotion grievance, this Court was also without jurisdiction to hear Cassidy's appeal.
This Court denied the Council's Motion. The Council's decision to raise the issue of indispensable
parties is a thinly veiled attempt to again make the argument that the Council does not have
jurisdiction to hear promotion cases. Essentially, the Council argues that the Salt Lake County Fire
Chief must be named a party to this action because the Council itself cannot act on promotions.
To make this argument, the Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service Council asks this court to
ignore the plain language of the statute which provides the basis for Cassidy's right to bring this
action. Utah Code Ann. § 17-28-13 (1995) specifically provides:
Any person aggrieved by a determination of the County Fire Civil Service Council may,
within 30 days after notice of the council's ruling, institute an action in the district court of
the county or in the county of the aggrieved person's residence, against the County Fire Civil
Service Council in its official capacity, setting out his grievance and his right to complain.
In its answer, the council may set out any matter in justification.(emphasis added).
There is no question that Cassidy has complied with the dictates of the statute. However, the
Council asserts that it's jurisdiction over promotions is "limited" and that only the Fire Chief can
make promotions. Based upon this analysis, the Council alleges that the Fire Chief is an
indispensable party and because "promotion" is at issue, Cassidy must name parties in addition to
those required by the statute. This argument is without merit because the Council's analysis ignores
the actual language of the statute with regard to grievances and promotions. The Fire Civil Service
statute explicitly provides:
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The County Fire Civil Service System rules shall provide for recruiting activities,
including the recruiting of minorities and women, job-related minimum
requirements, selection procedures, certification procedures, appointments,
probationary periods, promotion, position classifications, recordkeeping, reductions
in force, grievances and complaints, disciplinary action, work hours, holidays, and
other necessary and proper requirements not inconsistent with this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 17'-28-2 A(2)(emphasis added). Equally significant is another provision of the
same statute:
The County Fire Civil Service System shall be established and administered in a
manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the following merit
principals:
(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of
their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open
consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment.

(5) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of
personal administration without regard to race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, political affiliation, age, or handicap, and with proper
regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as citizens;

(7) provision of a formal procedure for processing the appeals and
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion,
restraint, or reprisal.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-28-2.6 (emphasis added). These provisions make clear that the system
provides for grievances to the Council related to promotions and constitutional violations.
The statutory dictate to provide a system of grievances provided by the legislature for
firefighters is inextricably intertwined with the requirement that employees be given a fair
opportunity for promotion and a process free from retaliation.

3

Because Cassidy's retaliation grievance falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Council, his compliance with the statutory appeal scheme is all that is required for this
matter to go forward.
Utah law requires a two step inquiry to determine if parties are indispensable. Seftel v.
Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). First, the court must determine whether an
absent party has sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary one. Id. at 944. If a party is
necessary, the court must then consider:
(1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence will prejudice him or her
or those already parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective
measures or provisions in the judgment; (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be
entered in the person's absence, and (4) the adequacy of the plaintiffs remedy if the action
is dismissed for nonjoinder. In light of these factors, the ultimate test under Rule 19(b) is
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed." (citations omitted).
Id. The legislature made a choice when it drafted the Fire Civil Service Statute to make the Council
the legal representative of Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County Fire Department in an appeal.
Given this analysis, it is clear that Cassidy's claim should not be dismissed for failure to name the
County Fire Chief.
II. CASSIDY HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
DECISION BELOW.
The Council argues that Cassidy failed to marshal the evidence supporting the decision
below. In fact, Cassidy cited in great detail the testimony which supported the relevant findings
made by Judge Homer Wilkinson and cited testimony in support of every material finding made by
the court below. For example, The Council argues that Cassidy did not cite evidence of Captain
Scott Collins' belief that Cassidy was a disruptive firefighter. In fact, Cassidy cites this evidence
throughout his brief. See; Opening Brief of Appellant James Cassidy, pp. 14-15,21-22. Similarly,
4

the Council argues that Cassidy did not marshal direct this court's attention to the fact that Cassidy
attempted to secretly tape his second promotion interview with the Fire Department. Contrary to
that assertion, Cassidy addressed that incident in detail. Id. at 22.
Utah law requires that Cassidy marshal all evidence which support the trial court's findings.
Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 326 (Ct. App. 1997). The Council implies that this
requires Cassidy to cite every negative reference to him in the record. That is not the rule. Rather,
Cassidy is required to cite every piece of evidence which supports the ruling of the court below. He
has done that, both in the section of his brief entitled "Marshaling the Evidence" and within the
Argument section. Because Cassidy has complied with the requirement that he marshal the
evidence, this Court should consider his appeal on its merits.
III. CASSIDY SUFFERED AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION.
The Council argues that the Fire Chiefs failure to promote Cassidy to Station Captain was
not an adverse employment action. This assertion is without merit In support of its argument, the
Council quotes cases which list examples of retaliatory conduct which happen not to include
promotion. None of the cases cited stand for the proposition that a retaliatory decision to deny an
employee a promotion is not actionable. In fact, the case law supports the opposite conclusion:
Examples of adverse employment actions include decisions that have a demonstrable
adverse impact on future employment opportunities or performances, demotions,
adverse or unjustified evaluations or reports; transfer or reassignment of duties;
failure to promote, and unfavorable letters of reference to prospective employers.
Metcalf v. Metropolitan Life, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1536 (Utah 1997), citations omitted, emphasis
added. This view is consistent with the position taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the
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Tenth Circuit in Kenworthv v. Conoco, Inc.. 979 F.2d. 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1992) (Affirming
judgment for plaintiff on claim of failure to promote in retaliation for bringing EEOC claim.)
IV. CASSIDY'S SPEECH WAS ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN.
The Council's argument that Cassidy's speech did not address a matter of public concern is
without merit. Cassidy's written complaints about the changes to the Fire Code Inspection process
make reference to his concerns about the threat to human life should the changes remain in effect.
R. 179-195. Similarly, the record testimony indicates that Cassidy's spoken concerns about the
Wildland Fire Crew included a concern that unilateral creation of the crew violated the Civil Service
Rules.1 Both of these matters rise to the level of public concern.
The Council suggests that Cassidy' s speech was not protected because it was made in private,
rather than communicated to the public. This argument has been rejected. "Neither the [First]
Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who
arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the
public." Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District 439 U.S. 410,415-16 (1979).
In Givhan. the Court considered whether an employee's speech was protected where she
confronted her supervisor in his office regarding her concerns about race discrimination. The School
District presented evidence of "a series of private encounters between petitioner and the school
principal in which petitioner allegedly made 'petty and unreasonable demands' in a manner variously
described by the principal as 'insulting,' 'hostile,' 'loud,' and 'arrogant.'" Id. at 412. Although these

1

Eventually, after Cassidy's complaints, the Utah Code was amended to specifically
allow for a Wildlands Fire Crew which functions outside the normal civil service process as
Cassidy claimed was necessary. Utah Code Ann. §17-28-5(4).
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conversations were lively and in private, as was Cassidy's conversation with Assistant Chief Berry,
they were considered protected First Amendment speech.
To the extent the council asserts that Cassidy's speech was not a matter of public concern
because it was not communicated to the public, the Council is in error. Because Cassidy's speech
addressed matters relating to public safety and compliance with the civil service law, it is protected
as speech on matters of public concern.
V. THE MANNER IN WHICH CASSIDY EXERCISED HIS RIGHT TO SPEAK ON MATTERS
OF PUBLIC CONCERN DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE EFFICIENT RUNNING OF THE
FIRE DEPARTMENT.
Once an employee established that his speech involves a matter of public concern, he must
show that his interest in the expression outweighs the government's interest in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In this regard, the "state bears a burden of justifying the discharge on
legitimate grounds." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). These are questions of law
for the district court.2 Andersen v. McCotter. 100 F.3d 723, 725 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court below
found, and the Council here asserts, that the manner in which Cassidy complained was sufficient to
strip his speech of constitutional protection. This conclusion is not supported by the facts.
The speech which Cassidy claims is protected is speech related to enforcement of the fire
code and the creation of the Wildlands fire crew. In neither case did was Cassidy's speech so

2

This requirement is distinct from the Mt. Healthy burden that requires the public
employer to prove that it would have taken the same action even without the protected conduct in
that the issue here is whether the manner of the complaints themselves was so disruptive or
threatening to efficiency as to make them unprotected.
7

disruptive as to be outside protection of the First Amendment and the statutory prohibition against
retaliation.
Cassidy's grievance to the Fire Civil Service Council was in writing and followed the
statutory directives regarding the various levels of appeal. Consequently, that appeal is protected by
the non-retaliation provisions of Utah Code Ann.§17-28-2.6(7) which specifically prohibits
retaliation against and employee for his use of the grievance process by mandating "provision of a
formal grievance procedure for processing the appeals and grievances of employees without
discrimination, coercion, restraint or reprisal."
The Fire Chief also indicated that he denied Cassidy a promotion because be brought his
concerns about enforcement of the fire code to the attention of Salt Lake County Public Works
Director Terry Holzworth. The manner of this complaint cannot be the basis for denying Cassidy
the promotion to Station Captain because it is explicitly protected by the Salt Lake County
Whistleblower ordinance which protects therightof employees "disclosure of information relating
to .. .specific danger to public health or safety." Salt Lake County Ordinance 2.80.110(A).3
Cassidy' s complaints about the Wildlands Fire Crew were also carried out in a manner which
cannot defeat Cassidy's right not to be retaliated against for exercising his right of free speech. In
one incident, Captain Scott Collins indicated that Cassidy disagreed with his views about the Wild
Land Fire Crew:

3

The Council suggests that Cassidy's reference to the Whistleblower statute is an attempt
to create a new cause of action based on the statute. Cassidy is not making any such claim.
Rather, his argument is that as long as the manner of his complaints were consistent with the
various avenues provided to employees by State law and County ordinance, the manner of those
complaints cannot be the basis for a denial of Cassidy's promotion.
8

Q. Now were there other areas in which you felt that he was not up to par, if you will?
A. Yes. I think that whenever there's a controversial issue afloat in the fire
department, Jim has to jump on it. I can name a few examples. Number one was the
Wild Land Fire Crew. When the fire department, a year ago, came out with the Wild
Land Fire Crew, I thought it was great. I thought it was a great idea.
He was telling everybody on the crew it was illegal, they can't do this, it's not right.
On the other hand, I'm telling the crew that I think it's great because I'd love nothing
more than to run meds or fight structure fires and watch somebody else up in the
hills.
So I felt like he was countermanding me or undermining me in a way. I tried to tell
him, hey Jim, I don't care whether you think it's legal or illegal. I think it's a great
policy, I think it's great. I think it's something we've needed.
Transcript at 237-38. In this instance, it is clear that Collins' dispute with Cassidy was over the
content of Cassidy's speech, not the fact that it occurred. Collins testimony does not evidence any
dispute with the fact that the Wildlands Fire Crew was being discussed.
The other incident where Cassidy discussed the Wildlands Fire Crew was with Assistant
Chief Don Berry:
Q. Okay, Did Jim ever take any overt action with regard to his opposition by going
to the press or going to a public figure?
A. No. What he did was he came in my office one day and basically made what I
thought were threats that if we went ahead with the Wild Land Crew he was going
to take action to see that we didn't hire those people.
Q. What did he specifically say that indicated to you that it was a threat?
A. He said that he was going to take some kind of action in opposition to our hiring
the Wild Land Crew.
Q. Well, wouldn't it also be considered action if he had gone and filed an objection
within the department to the implementation of that program? Wouldn't that also be
considered an objection?
A. Yes.
9

Q. Is there any difficulty with having someone take action or objection to public
policy?
A. The difficulty I have is when the fire fighter walks into the deputy chiefs office
and says that I'm opposed to your programs and I'm going to take action against it.
That's the problem. I saw that as a problem.
Transcript at 197. The conversation between Cassidy and Berry took place in Berry's office. There
is no testimony whatsoever that Cassidy's concerns about the Wildlands Fire Crew had any effect
on the crew or the efficiency of the Fire Department.4
Because all of Cassidy's complaints about the Fire Code were protected by either State
statute or County Ordinance, the manner of his complaints cannot defeat Cassidy's claims.
Moreover, Cassidy's complaints about the Wildlands Fire Crew cannot be considered so disruptive
as to strip them of protection where the real objection was to Cassidy's viewpoint.
VL THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT CASSIDY WOULD HAVE BEEN
DENIED A PROMOTION TO CAPTAIN WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF HIS PROTECTED
SPEECH.
Once Cassidy showed that his protected activity played a substantial role in the decision not
to promote him, the burden switched to the Fire Department to show "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [Cassidy's promotion] even in the
absence of the protected conduct." Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Dovle. 429 U.S. 274,287
(1977). Because the District Court erroneously concluded that Cassidy's speech was not protected,
the issue of whether the Council met its burden pursuant to Mt. Healthy was never addressed.
4

The Council suggests that it has wide leeway in suppressing speech because of the
quasi- military nature of the Fire Department. "The Pickering balancing test requires a 'factsensitive' weighing of the government interests." Anderson v. McCotter. 100 F.3d 723, 725 (10th
Cir. 1996). The Council's general assertions in this regard, none of which are supported by facts
on the record, are insufficient to overcome Cassidy's right to befreefromretaliation.
10

In order to meet its burden, the Council must show that if all of Cassidy's protected activity
were removed from the record, Cassidy would have been denied promotion for reasons not tainted
with retaliation. The Council has failed to make a record which can support this conclusion. In its
responsive brief, the Council asserts that Cassidy would not have been promoted anyway because
"his actions and disruptive nature within the fire station, coupled with his attempt to set up the fire
department with his concealed tape recorder, reflected a disloyal attitude." These assertions fail to
rescue the Council.
In order to rely upon Cassidy's disruptive actions, the Council must cite conduct which is
not associated with protected speech and which was relied on by the decisionmakers. As the court
indicated in Givhan, 439 U.S. at 416, this Court must distinguish between evidence which
demonstrates the same decision was justified and evidence demonstrating the same decision would
have been made. "Appellants seem to argue that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the
same decision would have been justified, but that is not the same as proving the same decision would
have been made." Id. The Council cannot meet this requirement. The Council's general citations
to Cassidy's "actions and disruptive nature" are certainly not sufficient. Moreover, the Council's
citations, elsewhere in the brief, to the testimony of Scott Collins is also insufficient because there
is no evidence that the decisionmakers ever spoke to Collins about the decision to promote Cassidy.
The testimony in the record is that Chief Hinman considered three factors in making the decision not
to promote Cassidy. First, he stated that he had conversations with Cassidy's station captain, Scott
Hawkinson, about Cassidy's performance. Transcript at 210. There is no evidence whatsoever in the
record about the content of this conversation. Second, Hinman indicated that he reviewed Scott
Collins' substandard review of Cassidy's performance:
11

Hinman: Finally, I had reviewed Captain Collins' substandard evaluation of Mr.
Cassidy and I felt that Captain Collins' comments attached to that evaluation
indicated to me that Mr. Cassidy really had demonstrated a lack of support for
administration policies and the goals of the fire department.
Q. I'm going to start from the back and go forward. You made reference to the substandard evaluati
A. That's right.
Q. So what substandard evaluation are you looking at.
A. That was the evaluation signed by Captain Collins. And I - Q. Of what year?
A. That was a prior evaluation.
Q. So you looked at an evaluation that was a year old instead of the evaluation that was most
current?
A. Yes, I did.
Transcript at 216-217. Neither Cassidy's below standard evaluation or the his then current "above
standard evaluation issued by Hawkinson were entered into evidence.5 Given the chiefs emphasis
on Collins' conclusions of "disloyalty," the Council cannot argue that this evaluation meets its Mt
Healthy burden of presenting evidence unrelated to Cassidy's protected speech. In addition to these
factors, Hinman also testified that Cassidy's grievance regarding the Fire Code played a role in the
decision to deny him a promotion:
Q. Okay, You also made a comment that you didn't promote Mr. Cassidy because
of an appeal he had filed with the Civil Service Council with regard to your
enforcement of the fire code.

5

Interestingly, the only evaluation entered into evidence is Scott Collins 1989 evaluation
written before Cassidy's protected speech. In that evaluation, Collins stated "Jim performs an
excellent job in the Acting Officer's Position at Station 51." Exhibit A to transcript of Civil
Service Council Hearing.
12

A. Yes.
Q. Is the mandates of the Uniform Fire Code an issue of public policy in which the
general public has right to be informed and knowledgeable of whether it's being
properly administered?
A. It's a matter of public policy, yes. Anyone from the public can come in and
request a copy of the Uniform Fire Code.
Q. Isn't there a policy that we have within the state where we encourage employees
to speak out on public policy issues they don't believe are being enforced correctly?
A. Yes, I think the County has a policy —
Q. What is your position on that issue in silencing that effort that would be taken by
that public employee bringing a complaint about how it was enforced?
A. At no time during that process did I attempt to silence Mr. Cassidy.
Q. If you use it as a factor to deny him his promotion, aren't you in fact silencing that
active challenge to public policy?
A. I don't know That's history. It happened. It affected my judgment - Q. Well that's the basis as to why you denied him his promotion.
A. Yes - Transcript at 217-218.
The Council places great emphasis on the testimony of Scott Collins that Cassidy did not
always perform perfectly during the time Cassidy worked for Collins. For example, Collins testified:
Q. Have you ever heard fire fighter Cassidy indicate to you that he was not going to
follow administrative policies or he was going to take some major, in terms of
messing around with them?
A. One time in particular - - And it could have been several times, I'm not sure. But
one time in particular he mentioned to me that he liked screwing around with two or
three ranks above him.
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And I said, well wait a minute, I'm two ranks above you. Do you like
screwing around with me? And he said, no, no. I mean the white shirts and
administration. He says, they're stupid and it's so fun screwing with them.

But it was time for him to turn things around. The crew is sick and tired of it. I'm
sick and tired of it. I'm sick and tired of hearing this isn't right and I'm going to fight
this. And I've had a lot of crew members come up to me. They don't want to work
around him, especially if he's the acting officer.
Transcript at 241. This testimony is only one example of a long recitation of Collins' dissatisfaction
with Cassidy. Nonetheless, while Collins may have believed these things about Cassidy, there is no
evidence anywhere in the record that he conveyed them to Hinman or anyone else making the
promotion decision.6 As a result, Collins' views about Cassidy may justify the decision not to
promote Cassidy, but they do not prove that the decision not to promote Cassidy would have been
the same as is required by Givhan.
The Council and the Court below also placed great emphasis on the fact that Cassidy brought
a hidden tape recorder into his last promotional interview. The District Court concluded that this
incident demonstrated "a disloyal attitude towards the department by the plaintiff." R. 282.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the department had good cause not to promote Cassidy. The
difficulty with this analysis is that the evidence is undisputed that the incident with the tape recorder
occurred after the decision had been made not to promote Cassidy. See; Statement of Facts, Brief

6

In its finding of fact, for example, the District Court found; "The Court finds that
plaintiffs poor attitude was reflected in his interactions with Captain Collins where he
reluctantly complied with directions or failed to perform." R. 282. While this evidence might
have influenced a decisionmaker to deny Cassidy a promotion, there is no evidence anywhere on
the record that the views of Captain Collins expressed on the witness stand were relied on by
anyone at the time the decision not to promote Cassidy was made.
14

of Appellee, pp. 6-7, indicating that the decision not to promote Cassidy was made in October of
1992 and the incident with the tape recorder occurred during November 1992.7 As a result, the
incident with the tape recorder cannot provide the non-discriminatory reason for the earlier decision
not to hire Cassidy.

The burden is on the Council to prove that it would have refused to promote Cassidy even
without the admitted anger against him for engaging in protected speech. The District Court
committed error by refusing to make this analysis despite a proper request by Cassidy. R. 232. Based
upon the record, the Court should conclude that the Council did not meet its burden in this regard
and remand the case to the District Court with an Order to enter judgment on liability issues in favor
of Cassidy.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court must reverse the finding of the District Court that
Cassidy's use of the grievance process and exercise of his First Amendment rights did not play a
determinative role in the decision not to promote him. The evidence is undisputed that Cassidy's
use of the grievance process to complain about the changes to the fire code addressed a matter of
public concern and played a substantial role in the decision to skip over Cassidy at the time he

7

The reason for this odd timeline is because the Department was required by Civil
Service Rules to interview Cassidy and another firefighter for the open Station Captain positions
but failed to do so before making its decision. Cassidy complained and the Fire Department
notified him and the other firefighter that they would be granted interviews but that the original
hiring decisions would stand. It was during this interview that Cassidy was discovered with the
hidden tape recorder. T. 115-117
15

was first on the promotion list. As a result, Cassidy respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
decision below as to liability and remand the case to the District Court for a hearing on damages.
DATED this %U

day of June, 1998.

CASSIDY
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